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Abstract— In recent years, noticeable progress has been made
in the development of quantum equipment, reflected through
the number of successful demonstrations of Quantum Key
Distribution (QKD) technology. Although they showcase the
great achievements of QKD, many practical difficulties still need
to be resolved. Inspired by the significant similarity between
mobile ad-hoc networks and QKD technology, we propose a
novel quality of service (QoS) model including new metrics for
determining the states of public and quantum channels as well
as a comprehensive metric of the QKD link. We also propose
a novel routing protocol to achieve high-level scalability and
minimize consumption of cryptographic keys. Given the limited
mobility of nodes in QKD networks, our routing protocol uses
the geographical distance and calculated link states to determine
the optimal route. It also benefits from a caching mechanism and
detection of returning loops to provide effective forwarding while
minimizing key consumption and achieving the desired utilization
of network links. Simulation results are presented to demonstrate
the validity and accuracy of the proposed solutions.
Index Terms— Quantum key distribution, quality of service,
routing protocol, real-time traffic.
I. INTRODUCTION
DURING the 30 years since the discovery of the firstquantum protocol [1], quantum technology has grown
significantly and is rapidly approaching high levels of maturity.
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The next natural step in the evolution of quantum systems
is to study their performance, suitability and convergence
with applications used in everyday life. Significant progress
in the development of quantum equipment has been reflected
through a number of successful demonstrations of QKD
networks [2]–[7] but without showing the clear suitability
to assess how such networks compete with their classical
counterparts under real-life conditions and in real-time traffic.
The traffic in these networks was mainly considered with
equal importance, and it was treated with the same priority.
While such approach may be acceptable for some applica-
tions, it is not suitable for voice, video and collaborative
applications. Since not all network traffic is equal, it should
not be treated equally. Hence, different applications may have
different service requirements with respect to the quality of
service (QoS). This paper addresses the question of using
real-time communication in QKD networks by considering
QoS mechanisms. The primary goal is to provide an adequate
QoS model that includes traffic classification and marking
mechanisms, QKD link metrics that can be used to describe the
state of the network accurately, and a scalable routing protocol
that minimizes the consumption of key material through the
equitable utilization of network resources.
QKD networks differ from traditional networks in several
aspects:
• Although theoretical and pioneering results have been
published in the field of quantum repeaters and quantum
relays [8]–[10], in practice they remain unachievable
with current technology1 [11], [13]. Therefore, commu-
nication is realized in a hop-by-hop [2] or key relay
manner [3], [14]. Both methods rely on the assumption
that all nodes along the path between the sender and the
receiver must be fully trusted, forming a trusted relay
QKD network [2], [15], [16].
1The idea behind implementing quantum routers is to use quantum entan-
glement of photons to communicate over different quantum channels. In short,
it means that multiple particles are linked together such that the measurement
of one particle’s quantum state determines the possible quantum states of
the other particles. Even when the particles are separated by a considerable
distance, they still make up a joint quantum system. The fidelity of a
quantum state decreases exponentially with the distance of its qubits due
to noisy quantum channels [11], [12]. In addition, quantum memory is
required to implement a quantum repeater according to [9], [10]. Although
implementations of quantum memories exist, which can store a qubit for
between several milliseconds to one second or even more, this is still too
short for practical applications.
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• Nodes are connected with QKD logical links, referred to
below as links, which employ two distinct channels: a
quantum channel, which is used for transmission of raw
cryptographic keys encoded in certain photon properties,
and a public channel, used for verification and process-
ing of the exchanged values. Each quantum channel is
always a point-to-point connection between exactly two
nodes [17], while public channels can be implemented
as any conventional connection which can include an
arbitrary number of intermediate devices [18].
• The key rate is interconnected with a length of optical
fiber such that a longer distance implies a lower key
rate due to absorption and scattering of photons [11],
[19]–[22]. Although key rates of 1 Mbps and above have
been achieved [5], [23]–[25], such solutions are limited
to very short distances. Therefore, both endpoints of
the corresponding link implement key buffers (storages)
of limited capacity, which are gradually filled at their
maximum key rate with the processed cryptographic
key, referred to below as key material, and subsequently
used for encryption/decryption of data flow [17], [26].
Key material denotes the symmetric cryptographic keys
that are generated during the QKD process, stored in
buffers (storages) and used subsequently for crypto-
graphic operations over user traffic.
• Without key material, cryptographic operations cannot
be performed, and a link can be described as temporar-
ily unavailable [15]. To provide information-theoretically
secure (ITS) communication, the key tends to be applied
with a One-Time Pad (OTP) cipher and authenticated
using an ITS message authentication scheme such as
Wegman-Carter when communicating over a public chan-
nel [27]–[29]. As a result, ITS communication requires
more bits of key material than the length of the secured
message [17]. The type of encryption algorithm used and
the volume of network traffic to be encrypted determines
the key storage emptying speed, referred to as the key
consumption rate. The key consumption rate denotes
the rate of key material being taken from buffers (stor-
ages) and used for cryptographic operations. Similarly,
the charging key rate (or simply key rate) denotes the
rate of new key material generation, that is, the rate of
adding new keys to the buffers (storages) [3], [17], [30].
• To meet the requirement to bypass untrusted nodes,
in practice, QKD networks are usually deployed as
overlay point-to-point networks which exhibit selfish
behavior, acting strategically to optimize performance
and resulting in dynamic and unpredictable link per-
formance [17], [26], [31]–[33]. Overlay networks use
existing underlying networks in an attempt to implement
a better service; one of their most important features is
the independence of the path offered by Internet service
providers (ISP).
This paper is organized as follows: Section II covers
related work, Section III points out the significant resem-
blance between QKD and ad-hoc networks, and Section IV
defines the requirements for providing QoS in QKD networks.
In Section V we propose a novel QoS model including a
GPSRQ routing protocol. The simulation setup is presented
in Section VII, with Section VII-A presenting the evaluation
of obtained results. Section VIII concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Given the common assumption that all nodes along a path
in a QKD network must be fully trusted [15], [16], QKD
networks were mainly analyzed from two aspects: security
and network performance. The idea of passive eavesdropping,
in which the adversary may use eavesdropping not to extract
information but to redirect the data flow towards a node
under their control, has been analyzed in [34]. Following a
similar idea, stochastic routing has been proposed to avoid
deterministic routing which is used in traditional routing
protocols [35], [36]. Game-theoretic techniques have been
used to find an optimal balance between interdependent service
quality criteria with distinct performance indicators [37].
QoS in QKD networks deployed previously has been largely
neglected, stating that it is somehow achievable without any
difficulties. Therefore, the Open Shortest Path First (OSPFv2)
routing protocol has been modified to use the amount of key
material as the routing metric while ignoring the performance
of the public channel [26], [38]. In [39], the author proposes
using unencrypted and non-authenticated communication for
the dissemination of OSPFv2 routing packets; this is simple
prey for an eavesdropper who is assumed to have unlimited
resources at their disposal, especially when passive eavesdrop-
ping is taken into account [34]. In [40], [41], unmodified
OSPFv2 was combined with reserving key material resources.
Considering the interdependence of the public and quantum
channels [42], reservation of key material resources does not
solve the problem of QoS since the routing path may be
inadequate for quantum channels.
III. SIMILARITIES BETWEEN QKD
AND MANET TECHNOLOGIES
The specific QKD issues and constraints described
above pose significant challenges in QKD network design.
However, by analyzing the characteristics of QKD net-
works, we note similarities with Mobile Ad Hoc Networks
(MANET) [43]–[45]. First, we specify the main characteristics
of QKD technology from a simple point of view:
• QKD links, described above, due to features of quan-
tum channels, are always implemented in point-to-point
behavior, and they can be roughly characterized by two
features: limited distance and key rate inversely pro-
portional to the distance [17]. Additionally, QKD links
may become unavailable when there is no enough key
material or when the public channel is congested [42].
Such behavior is similar to Wi-Fi links which are limited
in length and where the communication speed depends
on the user’s distance from the transmitter.
• One of the main features of QKD networks is the absence
of a quantum repeater or quantum router in practice,
therefore communication is usually performed on a hop-
by-hop basis [13], [17].
In MANET, communication takes place on a hop-by-hop
basis, and mobile nodes are typically powered by batteries,
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placing special attention on energy-aware solutions. The nodes
connect themselves in a decentralized, self-organizing manner
with no authority in charge of managing and controlling the
network [44], [46]. The battery power in MANET nodes can
be easily linked to the amount of key material in QKD key
storages. Given the node without a power supply (empty
batteries) is not an active member of the network, the same
analogy is valid for QKD networks where the node without
available key material cannot be used for data transmission.
The range limitations of wireless links can be mapped to the
limitations in the length of QKD links, while the absence of
dedicated network infrastructure (such as a router) is common
to MANET and QKD. Here we recognize the significant
similarity between these two technologies, allowing us to
propose a new approach to addressing QKD network issues.
IV. QOS IN QKD NETWORKS
The specific QKD constraints described above lead to the
conclusion that this type of network provides weak support
to QoS.
A. QoS Models
1) Integrated Service and QKD Networks: The basic con-
cept of the Integrated Service (IntServ) model is a per-flow
resource reservation using the Signaling Resource ReSerVation
Protocol (RSVP) before data transmission [47]. In our view,
the IntServ model is not suitable for QKD networks because
of the following:
• An inability to guarantee the reservation: when QoS is
provided in an IP network, an IP router has complete con-
trol over its packet buffers and the output link bandwidth,
and can directly schedule these resources. In contrast,
in an overlay network, the node cannot directly access
the available resources in the overlay path. It can only
rely on measurement techniques where high accuracy
cannot be guaranteed and it cannot directly control or
reserve resources in the underlying network. The only
thing that a node in a QKD network is able to do is to
guarantee resources of a quantum channel by reserving
key material in key storages. However, considering the
interdependence of public and quantum channels in a
QKD link [42], such reservation does not constitute any
gain.
• Signaling: RSVP is an out-of-band signalization protocol
which means that signaling packets contend for network
resources with data packets and consume a substantial
amount of scarce key material and network resources.
2) Differentiated Service and QKD Networks: Differen-
tiated Service (DiffServ) uses Differentiated Services Code
Point (DSCP) bits in the IP header and a base set of packet
forwarding rules known as Per-Hop-Behavior. DiffServ is
known as an edge-provisioning model, and it does not provide
any QoS guarantees per se [48]. The application of DiffServ
in its original form is limited in a QKD network due to the
following:
• Edge router selection: existing QKD technology limits
the deployment of a QKD network to the metropolitan
scale2 [2], [3], [5], [6], [49], [50]. In such a network,
it is necessary to clearly define the edge routers which
play a key role in the processing of traffic.
• Lack of Service Level Agreement: each network node
needs to comply with the rules for the classification
and processing of traffic of different priorities. However,
since the Service Level Agreement (SLA) concept is not
defined in a QKD network, it is questionable how nodes
of potentially different domains can negotiate traffic rules.
B. QoS Signalization in QKD Networks
In general, the QKD protocol which establishes a new key
material consists of six successive stages: a physical exchange
of quantum states between a pair of devices, extraction of the
raw key (sifting), error rate estimation, reconciliation, privacy
amplification, and authentication [51], [52]. Only the first stage
is performed over a quantum channel; all other stages are
performed over a public channel, resulting in the communi-
cation referred to as QKD post-processing. We propose an
extension of authenticated packets with signaling data which
provides an elegant way of tackling the problem of distribution
of signaling information without introducing additional traffic
overheads [53].
C. QoS Routing in QKD Networks
In our view, a routing protocol well-suited for operation
in dynamic QKD networks should meet the following main
design objectives:
• Reducing the consumption of scarce key material by
choosing the shortest path considering both channels of
the QKD link. The routing algorithm needs to find a
balance between the requirements, since a path that meets
the requirements of the public channel may not be suit-
able for the quantum channel and vice versa [17], [42].
• Given that the main objective of QKD is to provide ITS
communication, routing packets need to be encrypted and
authenticated [17], [54]. This means that the number of
routing packets needs to be minimized to preserve scarce
key material.
• To prevent denial of service, it is necessary to minimize
knowledge about the utilized routing path by reducing the
broadcast of routing packets [34].
• The routing protocol should be scalable to different
network sizes.
• Due to a low key charging rate and overlay networking
mode, link interruptions are common in QKD networks.
Hence, the routing protocol should be robust enough to
find an adequate replacement path.
In general, routing solutions can be divided into three
broad categories: source, hierarchical and distributed rout-
ing. The performance of source routing algorithms relies
on the availability of precise link state information, while
the dynamic nature of QKD networks makes the available
2In 2014, a QKD system connecting the cities of Hefei-Chaohu-Wuhu
(HCW) in China with a total of nine QKD nodes was reported in [6]. Thirteen
QKD devices within nine nodes in total were employed to support the two
QKD networks and the intercity QKD link.
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link state information inherently imprecise. Given that the
constant maintenance of link state information is mostly done
by periodic flooding, this solution is inadequate for QKD
networks. Although several examples exist of hierarchical
network organization [4]–[6], in our opinion, such organization
is not suitable for QKD networks since nodes of upper
hierarchical levels represent a potentially easy target for the
attack to disassemble the network. In distributed routing,
the computation of the path is shared among network nodes
on a periodic basis (proactive) or only when a routing path is
requested (reactive). Proactive routing protocols mainly use the
static update period time for keeping routes up-to-date, which
contradicts the dynamic nature of QKD networks. Therefore,
in overlay networks, reactive routing performs better in terms
of efficiency and stability than proactive routing [55], [56].
V. FQKD: A FLEXIBLE QUALITY OF SERVICE
MODEL FOR QKD NETWORKS
To overcome problems of providing QoS in a dynamic
environment, we present a flexible QoS model for QKD
networks (FQKD). Our model avoids a centralized resource
management scheme or reservation of resources mechanism.
Instead, we turn to a distributed approach to control traffic
loads by providing soft-QoS constraints without flow or ses-
sion state information maintained in support of end-to-end
communication. FQKD defines three roles for nodes in a QKD
network: ingress, interior and egress. Each node can take any
of these roles depending on the position in network flow.
A source node which sends data is referred to as an ingress
node. Interior nodes are nodes that forward data to the final
destination node, which is referred to as an egress node.
A. Provisioning and Conditioning
As shown in Fig 1, the FQKD model consists of a
sender-based classifier, waiting queues, local node-based
admission controller, crypto module and dynamic regulation
of admitted sessions at the MAC layer. The classifier is input
at the ingress node to distinguish between traffic classes by
marking the DSCP field in the IP packet header. FQKD
distinguishes between three traffic classes with corresponding
DSCP values: best-effort, real-time and premium class. For
each class, separate waiting queues are defined and processed
by priority. The packets are forwarded by interior nodes in
per-hop behaviour associated with the assigned DSCP value.
Considering that nodes in QKD networks continuously gen-
erate new keys at their maximum rate3 [26], before setting the
route, the routing protocol contacts the admission controller to
filter those links to its neighbors that have sufficient resources
to serve the classified network packet. The routing protocol
calculates the path and the packet is forwarded to the MAC
layer for further processing. Otherwise, if no available link
is found, the packet waits in the queue for reprocessing.
In FQKD, additional waiting queues are installed between the
3QKD nodes aim to generate as much key material as possible. Therefore,
nodes continuously generate traffic at the highest rate allowed by the network.
More information about the impact of public channel states on the intensity
of the key rate can be found in [42].
Fig. 1. FQKD model. First, the incoming application package is classified
and forwarded to the routing protocol which contacts the admission control to
verify there are sufficient resources for processing the data. If true, the packet
is stored in the appropriate waiting queue and encrypted before sending to
the network. Arrows denote communication between model elements and the
flow of the processed packet.
L3 and L4 TCP/IP layer to avoid conflicts in decision making
which could lead to inaccurate routing. Suppose the queues
are implemented on the data link layer (L2) only, and suppose
that they are half filled with packets. Since the routing protocol
used the routing metric that at the time t1 of calculating
the route had a different value from the time t2 when the
packet came online in the queue to be served, it follows that
significant changes to the state of links in the time interval
∆t = t2 − t1 could occur, which can lead to inaccurate and
incorrect routing. Instead, by exploiting higher level waiting
queues, the packet for which the route is calculated will be
directly forwarded to lower layers and immediately sent to
the network. This implies the usage of one set of waiting
queues (set of three waiting queues for best-effort, real-time
and premium traffic classes) for all network interfaces. Using
queuing at the L2 layer is not excluded, but additional attention
is given to queues at a higher level due to the dynamic nature
of the network.
Assuming the key rate is constant in time when the quantum
channel has a fixed length [17], [26], it is evident that the
key storage can be identified with the Token Bucket traffic
shaping mechanism as shown in Fig. 2. This simplifies the
view of the admission controller, which behaves as the traffic
conditioner. The volume of traffic over the QKD link is limited
by the amount of key material in key storage which is used
for encryption or authentication of data over that link. The
key material storage of link k between nodes a and b can be
represented using following parameters:
• The time measurement moment t,
• The average key generation rate rk , measured in bits
per seconds and used to indicate the charging rate of the
storage,
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Fig. 2. Traffic processing in the FQKD model.
• The key material storage depth Mmax,k, used to indicate
the capacity of the storage,
• The current value Mcur,k(t), representing the amount of
key material in the storage at the time of measurement t,
where it holds that Mcur,k(t) ≤ Mmax,k.
• The threshold value Mthr,a,b(t) or simply Mthr,k(t)
described in more detail below,
• QKD is also known as Quantum Key Growing [57], [58]
or Quantum Key Expansion [59], since it needs a
small amount of key material pre-shared between parties
(denoted with Mmin,k) to establish a larger amount of the
secret key material. This pre-shared key material is used
for QKD post-processing and authentication [29], [59].
The amount of key material over a time interval T depends
on the key generation rate and the available amount of key
material in the storage, and can be calculated using Equa-
tion (1). The average operational rate, that is the rate at which
packets can be served over an interval T , can be calculated
using Equation (2). As T → ∞, the operational rate Ak(T )
approaches the charging key rate rk .
Dk(T ) ≤ rk · T + Mcur,k(T )−Mmin,k(T ) (1)
Ak(T ) =
Dk(T )
T
= rk +
Mcur,k(T )−Mmin,k(T )
T
(2)
However, the overall amount of traffic data that can be
transmitted over link k in a time interval T can be calculated
by dividing the value obtained from Equation (1) and the ratio
Lk which is the quotient of key length used for encryption with
authentication and the length of the data message. Note that
for ITS communication, which usually involves the OTP cipher
and Wegman-Carter authentication, more bits of key material
than the length of the data message are required (Lk > 1) [17].
An incoming packet is served from the queue only if there
is enough key material in the storage. Otherwise, the packet
remains in the queue waiting for storage to be charged. The
length of the queue is limited, and traffic-shaping algorithms
are in charge of packet management operations. To avoid
blocking work due to the lack of the key material used to
generate new key material, special attention is placed on
the categorization of the traffic. If storage stops charging,
the purpose of the link loses functionality. Therefore, the traffic
generated by the post-processing application has the highest
Fig. 3. Simple topology showing the calculation of Mthr: a) the traffic is
routed along the route a-b-c-e; b) the traffic is routed along the path a-b-c
regardless of key material depletion of link c-e; c) calculated Mthr values
based on Mcur values of all links connected to a given node.
priority and is sorted in the premium queue. Only traffic from
post-processing applications can use the key material when
Mcur,k(t) ≤ Mmin,k while the traffic from the other two
queues is served only when Mcur,k(t) > Mmin,k.
The threshold value Mthr is proposed to increase the
stability of QKD links, where Mthr,k(t) ≤ Mmax,k. The para-
meter is explained by considering the simple topology shown
in Fig. 3 where node a needs to communicate with remote
node e. Suppose the routing protocol uses only information
about the state of its links with its neighbors. Then, assuming
that all network links have the same performance of public
channels, we consider only the state of key storages which
are marked next to links as shown in Fig. 3-a. Upon receipt
of the packet from node a, the routing protocol on node b
selects path b-c since the link b-d has a lower performance.
However, if node b does not consider the state of links that
are more than one hop away, the traffic may stuck on the
link between nodes b and c as shown in Fig. 3-b. To avoid
such behaviour, we propose using the Mthr value. Each node
i calculates value Li summarizing the Mcur values of links to
its neighbors and dividing it by the number of its neighbors Ni
using Equation (3). Then, each node exchanges calculated
value of Li with its neighbors. The minimum value denoted
by Equation (4) is accepted as a reference threshold value of
the link.
Li =
∑Ni
k=0 Mcur,i,k
Ni
(3)
Mthr,i,j = min{Li, Lj} (4)
As shown in Fig. 3-c, node b calculates Lb = 36.66, while
node c calculates Lc = 25. The threshold value of the link
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Fig. 4. Qm of link between nodes s and i for different values of Mthr ;
Mmax,s,i = 100.
b-c is set to Mthr,b,c = 25 and it is included in link metric
calculation as described in Section V-B. The higher the value
of Mthr, the better the state of links that are more than one
hop away.
B. QKD Link Metric
Popular metrics from conventional networks which describe
the state of the communication link cannot be adequately used
in QKD networks since they only describe the public channel.
Therefore, we propose new metrics that clearly define the state
of the QKD link taking into account its most essential features.
1) The Quantum Channel Status Metric: At the moment
of serving the packet, the remaining key material in the key
storage is the main factor contributing to the link’s availability;
this is because without key material, cryptographic operations
cannot be performed and secure communication over the link
is not possible. We use Equation (6) to express the state of
the quantum channel between nodes s and i, where Qfrac,s,i
is the ratio of the squared amount of key material at the
time of measurement (Mcur,s,i2) multiplied by the threshold
value (Mthr,s,i) and the cubed capacity of the key storage
(Mmax,s,i3) as defined by Equation (5). Qfrac,s,i is in the
range [0,1], and it highlights the current amount of key
material on closest links in relation to the amount of key
material of links that are further away since more distant links
are unreachable when links to neighbors are unavailable.
Qfrac,s,i =
Mcur,s,i
2 ·Mthr,s,i
Mmax,s,i
3 (5)
Qm,s,i = 1− Qfrac,s,i
e(1−Qfrac,s,i)
(6)
Qm,s,i is the utility function associated with the key material
level of the link. Qm,s,i uses an exponential formula to address
the fact that the lower the amount of key material in the
storage, the more critical the situation, and the less time is
left for the routing protocol to react.
The value of Qm,s,i is normalized as a grade ranging
from 0 to 1 as shown in Fig. 4, where a lower value
means a better quantum channel state. In the example shown
in Fig. 3-c, the routing protocol should favor the link b-d since
Qm,b,d < Qm,b,c.
2) The Public Channel Status Metric: Instead of
using popular approaches from conventional or overlay
networks [31], [60], we use meta-data of keys such as the
time duration of the key establishment process to assess
the state of the public channel effectively. We define Pm,s,i
with Equation (7) to evaluate the state of the public channel
between nodes s and i where Tlast,s,i is the length of time
spent on the establishment of the key material at the time of
measurement and Tmaximal,s,i is the maximum time that can
be tolerated for the establishment of the key. Tmaximal,s,i is
calculated as the double value of the average duration of key
material establishment process, in the long run, denoted as
Taverage in Equation (8).
Pm,s,i =
Tlast,s,i + ∆t
Tmaximal,s,i
(7)
Tmaximal,s,i = 2 · Taverage (8)
∆t is used to describe the freshness of the information
and is defined as the difference between the current time of
the measurement and the time when the Tlast,s,i is recorded.
Note that Taverage is not equal for all links of the network
since it depends on the load of the network, types of quantum
and network devices, QKD post-processing application and the
state of the public channel.4 The value of Pm,s,i mainly falls
in the range [0,1] where the lower value means a better public
channel state. Values greater than 1 indicate that the link has
a problem with establishing new key material, and such links
should not be considered.
3) The Overall QKD Link Status Metric: Key material
depletion is not the same for all links since it depends on the
type of encryption algorithm used and the volume of network
traffic to be encrypted. For example, a QKD link between
nodes s and i having a low value of Qm,s,i may be suitable for
a network flow encrypted with less secure algorithms which
require less key material than OTP (such as the AES cipher),
but it may not be suitable for encryption using OTP. Thus,
factor α which reflects the balance between the requirements
is introduced in Equation (9) to compensate for this effect
using the utility functions of the quantum and public channel
in the [0,1] range where a lower value means a better overall
link state.
Rm,s,i = α ·Qm,s,i + (1− α) · Pm,s,i (9)
Parameter α takes the value in the [0,1] range; if the OTP
cipher is used, we suggest the value of α = 0.5. This means
that both channels of the QKD link are considered equally.
If the AES cipher is used, α can be set to a lower value to
4In practice, the QKD link employs three channels. The QKD
quantum-channel and the QKD distillation-channel are usually referred to
as the quantum channel and public channel, respectively. The third channel is
known as the (time-stable) synchronization channel and cannot be separated
from the quantum channel physically to two fibers, because it delivers time
references. From the perspective of higher network layers, the synchronization
channel is part of the key generation (growing) process. If the impact
of this channel on the entire process were to be considered, the signals
in the synchronization channel need to be sufficiently large so that even
co-propagating classical channels or spoiled signals are irrelevant and key
generation is disturbed. Such major non-synchronization would be reflected
in the overall duration of the key generation process, which is considered
using Equation (7).
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put a greater emphasis on the public channel due to its lower
requirements for key material, depending how frequently it is
refreshed and the length of the AES key used.
VI. GREEDY PERIMETER STATELESS ROUTING
PROTOCOL FOR QKD NETWORK
Driven by the similarities between the MANET and QKD
networks discussed in Section III, we present the Greedy
Perimeter Stateless Routing Protocol for QKD networks
(GPSRQ). The primary motivation for designing GPSRQ is
to minimize the number of routing packets and to achieve
high-level scalability by using distributed geography reactive
routing.
We assume that all nodes know the geographical locations
of all other network nodes they wish to communicate with.
Therefore, there is no periodic flooding of the node location
details, and we assume a location registration and lookup
service that maps the node address to a location. This paper
does not deal with implementation details of such a service,
but we assume it can be implemented using internal or other
communication channels [61]. As indicated in Section IV-B,
authenticated packets in QKD post-processing can be used to
exchange information about the geographical position of nodes
effectively. Although several experiments have been conducted
regarding mobile QKD networking [62]–[66], due to the high
sensitivity of quantum equipment to various environmental
factors5 and relatively low key generation rates in free-space
QKD links [24], [59], [68]–[70], in this paper we assume
that QKD networks are composed of static nodes representing
secure access points6. We follow the idea “the greater the
distance separating two nodes, the slower they appear to
be moving with respect to each other” outlined in [71] to
implement caching in GPSRQ, which is discussed further
below.
GPSRQ sets up a network without hierarchical organization,
which means that all nodes in the network are of equal
importance. Nodes do not exchange routing tables, which
significantly minimizes the consumption of scarce key material
and reduces the probability of passive eavesdropping [34].
Route selection, that is the decision about the next hop, is made
in per-hop behavior such that the packet is moved closer
to the destination based on the states of links in the local
environment and on the geographical distance from the node.
An eavesdropper is not able to intercept routing packets and
find out the exact route to the destination, since it is not known
at which node’s network interface the packet will be forwarded
until the last moment. GPSRQ uses two packet forwarding
algorithms: greedy forwarding and recovery mode forwarding.
A. Greedy Forwarding
By definition, greedy forwarding entails forwarding to the
neighbor geographically closest to the destination. An example
5The key rate may vary due to humidity, temperature, stability of devices,
global radiation, pressure, dust, sunshine duration or other factors [17], [67].
6Low mobility within a geographic region or slow node movement are
supported as long as the service for distributing geographic locations of nodes
can accurately and safely distribute locations to all nodes in the network.
Fig. 5. Ingress node a which is surrounded by three adjacent nodes b, d,
and k, aims to communicate with the egress node g. In the absence of a path
over node b, node a writes in the internal cache that it is not possible to route
packets along the path a-b towards the region marked with a circle of radius
d(b,g)/2 with the center in node g. Any further request for routing towards
any node which is placed in the defined circle region will be ignored over the
route via node b, and an alternative route needs to be found.
of greedy forwarding is shown in Fig. 5, where ingress node
a which is surrounded by three adjacent nodes b, d, and k,
needs to communicate with egress node g. Ingress node a
forwards the packet to b, as the Euclidean distance between
b and g is smaller than the distance between g and any
of a’s other neighbors. Such greedy forwarding is repeated
on interior nodes and it stops when the packet reaches its
destination. GPSRQ aims to maximize network utilization
by using different paths for different traffic classes. It uses
Equation (10) to calculate the path to forward the packet:
Fa,g,v =
(
1− β) ·Ra,v + β ·Gv,d (10)
where Ra,v denotes the state of link between source node
a and neighboring node v using Equation (9) and Gv,g
represents the Euclidean distance between neighboring node v
and destination node g, for each node v which belongs to the
set Na of all neighbors of source node a, ∀v ∈ Na. All routes
towards the destination are sorted in descending order using
Equation (10) and the route with the lowest value is used.
GPSRQ uses parameter β with a value in the [0,1] range to
manage network utilization by choosing between forwarding
along the geographically shortest route or the route that has
the most available resources. We discuss simulation results for
different values of β in Section VII-A5.
Greedy forwarding relies on the knowledge of the geograph-
ical location and state of links to neighbors, which results in
a high level of network scalability. However, in some cases,
the route to the destination requires forwarding the packet over
a neighboring node which is geographically further from the
destination than the node which forwards the packet. In cases
when a local maximum occurs, an alternative recovery-mode
forwarding is used. To increase scalability and exclude routes
which do not lead to the destination, we propose a robust
caching mechanism to preserve key material consumption.
Consider the example shown in Fig. 5 where we further
suppose that link b-f is unavailable due to a lack of key
material. When node b realizes there is only one interface
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available (the interface which was used to receive the packet
from node a), it marks a “loop” field in the GPSRQ packet
header and returns the packet back to node a. Then, node a
calculates the Euclidean distance d(b,g) between node b and
destination node g and writes in its internal cache memory that
it is not possible to route towards the region which is marked
with a circle of radius d(b,g)/2 and the center in node g along
the path a-b. Upon receiving any further requests for routing
towards the node placed in the defined circle region, node a
will ignore the route over node b and look for an alternative
route. The validity of cached record is set to time interval
defined using Equation (11):
Tcache = Tmaximal,b,g/2 (11)
where Tmaximal,b,g is defined by Equation (8). The over-
all goal is to reduce the dynamics of the network
topology changes using the scalable cache mechanism.
In Section VII-A6, we discuss the impact of different values
on cache validity. After the cached record expires, the node is
allowed to try establishing the connection once again. In the
event when GPSRQ detects there is no neighbor closer to the
destination, it enters recovery mode.
B. Recovery Mode Forwarding
Recovery mode involves using the well-known right-hand
rule which states that the next edge from node k upon
arriving from node a is edge (k,j) which is sequentially
counterclockwise to edge (a,k) [72]. However, for first for-
warding, the packet is forwarded along edge (a,k) which is
counterclockwise to node a from line ag. The packet stays
in recovery mode until it reaches a node which is closer to
the destination than the node where forwarding in recovery
mode started. To avoid routing loops, the GPSRQ header
contains information about the IP address of the node at which
the packet entered recovery mode and the outgoing interface
which was used for first forwarding. If the loop is detected
by analyzing the packet header, the packet is returned to the
previous node for rerouting and adding a new entry to the
node’s internal cache memory. If the public channel of link
j-i is unavailable, there is no available path to destination g.
Source node a forwards the packet to node k which forwards
the packet to node j in greedy forwarding mode. Since link j-i
is unavailable, node j is not able to find any neighbor closer
to the destination so it enters recovery mode, sets the value
of the field “inRec” to 1, writes its IP address to the header
field “recPosition”, writes the interface number which leads
to node l in the “recIF” header field and forwards the packet
to node l since it is on the first edge counterclockwise about
j from the line jg as required by the right-hand rule. Upon
receipt of the packet, node l inspects the header and remains
in recovery mode since node j in which the packet entered
recovery mode is closer to the destination g. Then, the packet
is forwarded to node k which forwards the packet back to
node j. When node j detects its IP address from the header field
“recPosition”, it adds a record to the internal cache memory
stating that it is not possible to reach destination node g via
node l by adding a record consisting of the triple: IP address
Fig. 6. Packet encapsulation with the QKD header and QKD command
header.
TABLE I
GPSRQ PACKET HEADER FIELDS USED IN
RECOVERY MODE FORWARDING
of hop l, the radius of circle region d(l,g)/2 and the value of
the circle center which is set to the location of node g. Given
that there is no other interface available, node j sets GPSRQ
header field “loop” to 1 and returns the packet to node k which
adds a record to its cache memory stating that it is not possible
to reach destination node g via node j. Then, node k sets the
field “loop” to 2 and tries again with greedy forwarding where
node j is excluded as the next hop. The packet is forwarded to
node l which forwards the packet to node j. Since node j does
not have any other interface available, it will set the value of
header field “loop” to 1, and return the packet to node l which
will add to its cache memory a record stating that it is not
possible to reach destination node g over node j. The packet
is returned to node k and then it is returned to node a. This
procedure is repeated until a feasible path to the destination
is found. Otherwise, if no available path is found, the packet
is gradually returned to the source node which is allowed to
discard the packet while keeping updated records in the cache
memory of other nodes.
C. GPSRQ Protocol Implementation
To make the routing operation easier, encryption and
authentication are performed on the data link TCP/IP
layer [17], [73]. However, in previously deployed QKD net-
works the QKD header was transported unencrypted [74].
A denial-of-service attack is possible if an eavesdropper is
able to block high importance packets such as routing packets
or post-processing operation packets which would disable the
link [75] or divert traffic to the node under an attacker’s
control [34]. Therefore, we propose using the QKD Command
header, which is encrypted together with the packet payload
(Fig. 6). Instead of adding the GPSRQ header to the packet,
which would increase the amount of key used for encryption,
values from the GPSRQ header which are listed in Table I
are rearranged to the QKD header and QKD command header
before transmission. Upon receiving the packet, the values are
moved from the QKD header and QKD command header to
the GPSRQ header.
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In typical multimedia communication protocols, excessively
delayed packets are not used for the reconstruction of trans-
mitted data at the receiver [76]. We propose the extension
of the QKD header by including Timestamp and MaxDelay
fields to carry the packet’s timestamp and maximum tolerated
delay, respectively. The values of these fields are written at the
ingress node, while the GPSRQ at the interior node checks the
values before forwarding the packet, including the previously
mentioned field “loop”. If the value of the “loop” field is equal
to 2, the packet was in a loop which was later avoided and
marked in the internal cache in the previous nodes, so no
action is taken against the packet. If the value of the “loop”
field is equal to 0, it means that the packet was not previously
in the loop. Then, GPSRQ checks whether the delay of the
packet, which is calculated as the difference between the
current timestamp and the Timestamp value, is greater than
the MaxDelay. If this is true, GPSRQ sets the “loop” field
to 1 and returns the packet to the previous-hop which will
result in adding a new entry to the internal cache in previous
nodes as mentioned earlier. The function of the Timestamp and
MaxDelay fields is similar to the Time-to-Live (TTL) field in
the IP header of conventional networks, but with the aim of
minimizing the consumption of scarce key material in QKD
network.
VII. SIMULATION SETUP
To ensure simulations are independent of the topology or
characteristics of any specific network, random graphs were
constructed. Random network topologies were generated using
the Waxman model [77], which is recommended for small and
medium-size networks which include locality aspects such as
QKD networks [2], [6], [49]. Additionally, the Waxman model
corresponds to the requirement for the implementation of QKD
networks without hierarchical multi-plane organization [78]
since it spreads nodes randomly on a grid and adds links
randomly, such that the probability Pe of interconnecting two
nodes in a single plane is parameterized by the Euclidean
distance separating them, as defined using Equation (12):
Pe(u, v) = Θ · exp−
d(u,v)
Ω·Λ (12)
where d(u, v) is the Euclidean distance between nodes u and v,
Λ denotes the maximum possible distance between two nodes
where 0 < Ω,Θ ≤ 1. The parameter choices are constrained
to assure Pe(u, v) ∈ [0, 1]. In total, 1290 simulations were per-
formed with 30 randomly generated simulation seeds defining
random network topologies and random values of the initial
amount of key material in key storages. We evaluated GPSRQ
(β = 0.6; Taverage = 5) against OSPFv2 which was used in
previously deployed QKD networks [17], [26], [39]–[41], and
against DSDV which was used in our previous work [75]. The
simulation was performed using the QKD Network Simulation
Model (QKDNetSim) [79] to deploy GPSRQ and DSDV while
NS-3-DCE v.1.9 was used to deploy the OSPFv2 routing
protocol [80]. We used the BRITE topology generator to
generate random topologies according to the Waxman model
since it is supported under NS-3 and the source code is freely
available [81]. NS-3-DCE and QKDNetSim were set to share
Fig. 7. The number and average sizes of routing packets.
the same seed file to generate random values which enabled us
to use the same random topologies with the same configuration
values in QKDNetSim and NS-3- DCE. Simulations included
static networks with 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60 and 70 nodes which
were randomly placed in a rectangular region and connected to
QKD links with the following settings: minimal amount of key
material 1 Mbyte; maximal amount 100 Mbyte; initial amount
randomly generated in the [0.5, 25] MByte range; maximal
bandwidth of the link set to 10 Mbps; charging key rate set to
100 kbps with the charging key period of seven seconds. The
Waxman router model was used with the following parameter
values: m = 2; Λ = 100; Ω = 0.4; Θ = 0.4; The
first node was set as the source of traffic, while the last
randomly placed node was set as the destination. The source
node generated UDP traffic with a 1 Mbps rate and fixed
packet size of 512 bytes which were encrypted using OTP
and authenticated using VMAC with a 32-bit authentication
tag [27]–[29]. The duration of the simulation was 150 seconds,
while the capacity of waiting queues per device on the L2 and
L4 layers (used for GPSRQ only) was set to 1000 packets.
The parameters not given here are the default parameters of
QKDNetSim and NS-3-DCE. In following sections, simulation
results are presented using box-plot graphs.
A. Simulation Results and Evaluation
Although GPSRQ can achieve valuable results on
non-planar graphs, one of the drawbacks of GPSRQ is the
massive consumption of key material in non-planar networks
since geographical routing cannot quickly determine the short-
est path towards the destination which leads to unnecessary
forwarding. It is, therefore, advisable to convert non-planar
graphs into planar graphs in which geographic routing proto-
cols can be effectively used. Instead of using the heuristic to
exclude the intersecting edges [82], we modified the BRITE
random topology generator to generate random planar Gabriel
Graphs7 (GG) which are defined as follows: “An edge (u, v)
exists between vertices u and v if no other vertex w is present
within the circle whose diameter is the Euclidean distance
d(u,v)” [83], [84].
1) Routing Protocol Overhead: Fig. 7 shows the routing
protocol overhead, measured by the number and average sizes
7The BRITE random generator with Gabriel Graph module is available at
https://bitbucket.org/mickeyze/brite-planar-graph
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of routing packets sent network-wide during the simulation for
GPSRQ, DSDV and OSPFv2. OSPFv2 is a widely deployed
link-state routing protocol which uses the periodic Link State
Announcement (LSA) flooding mechanism to update link-state
databases describing the network topology [85]. By default,
OSPFv2 floods LSA update information every 30 minutes,
and it exchanges Hello packets to establish and maintain a
neighbor relationship every 10 seconds. If a node does not
receive a Hello message from a neighbor within a fixed dead
interval of time which is set to a default of 40 seconds
for point-to-point networks, OSPFv2 modifies its topology
database entries to indicate that the neighbor is unavailable.
DSDV is a proactive routing protocol which periodically
broadcast its routing table to its neighbors (every 15 seconds
by default). Besides, DSDV uses triggered updates when
the network topology suddenly changes. With the increase
of the number of network nodes, the number of triggered
packets is rising, which makes the average size of DSDV
packets to decline [60], [86]. In contrast, GPSRQ relies on the
knowledge of the geographical position and state of links to
neighbors, which provides a high level of network scalability.
As such, it periodically exchanges only Mthr packets defined
in Section V-A every time new key material is stored in key
storages; the value was set to seven seconds in our simulations.
It is important to note that DSDV and OSPFv2 exchange
their routing packets using UDP, while GPSRQ exchanges
Mthr values using TCP, so Fig 7 shows all packets including
TCP SYN, TCP ACK and TCP FIN. We performed several
simulations where Mthr was set to 5, 15, 20 and 30 seconds
besides the exchange of Mthr every time new key material is
added to key storage. The data showed the same values, letting
us conclude that a single exchange of a Mthr value in a QKD
post-processing period is adequate for the smooth operation
of GPSRQ. In our simulations, values from GPSRQ packets
were moved into the QKD command header as described in
Section VI-C, while DSDV and OSPFv2 packets were sent
using the standard QKD header [17]. Fig 7 shows that GPSRQ
consumes the lowest amount of key material for cryptographic
operations in routing packets, while Fig. 9 shows that GPSRQ
consumes the greatest amount of the available key material,
but for securing application traffic as seen from the PDR value
(Section VII-A2).
2) Packet Delivery Ratio: The Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR),
calculated as the ratio of received and sent application packets,
is used to assess the effectiveness of the routing protocol
within the specified simulation environment. Fig. 8 shows that
GPSRQ is able to successfully find available routes to the
destination when compared to OSPFv2 and DSDV. Due to the
significant value of the dead interval, OSPFv2 is not able to
react quickly to the changes in network topology, which results
in a reduced PDR value. DSDV exchanges routing packets
more often; this returns a higher PDR value, although it is
still significantly lower than GPSRQ. It is important to note
that in some simulation scenarios PDR could not reach value
“1” because it depends on the network conditions as defined
by random values, such as the initial amount of key material
in key storages. More precisely, because of the randomly
assigned amount of the initial key material in key buffers,
Fig. 8. Packet Delivery Ratio - the ratio of received and sent application
packets shows that GPSRQ achieves significantly better results for networks
with a larger number of nodes.
Fig. 9. Key material consumption - GPSRQ consumes more material because
it successfully routes traffic to the destination.
Fig. 10. Number of hops - GPSRQ finds paths to destinations that are not
visible to other protocols.
several simulated scenarios were generated with little or no
key available to establish the path to the destination regardless
of which routing protocol is being used. However, using the
same seed files ensures identical network conditions for all
tested protocols in all simulated scenarios. By increasing the
number of nodes, there is also a growing number of possible
routes to the destination, which suits the GPSRQ protocol to
achieve significantly better results than the other two protocols.
3) Path Length: Fig. 10 shows that GPSRQ recognizes
paths to the destination which are not visible to DSDV
and OSPFv2. More specifically, GPSRQ with the detection
mechanism of the returning loop increases the number of
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Fig. 11. End-to-end delay - GPSRQ caching techniques provide scalability
and robustness resulting in the low and consistent delay.
Fig. 12. Scaled average number of hops and scaled average delay for various
values of β from Equation (10).
forwarding instances. Still, due to scalable caching mecha-
nism, GPSRQ is able to find the shortest feasible path to the
destination.
4) End-to-End Delay: Our results show that the scalable
caching in GPSRQ has a significant impact on the end-to-
end delay. As shown in Fig. 11, values are significantly lower
when compared to DSDV and OSPFv2 due to the active
measurements of link states and detection of returning loops
to exclude those links that do not lead to the destination. The
end-to-end delay for GPSRQ does not notably increase with
the number of nodes, leading to the conclusion that GPSRQ
supports network scalability and robustness.
5) The Impact of GPSRQ β Parameter: GPSRQ uses
Equation (10) to balance between the geographically short-
est path and the path with the best performance. To show
the impact of parameter β, we conducted simulations on
30 randomly generated network topologies with 30 randomly
placed nodes, changing the values of β. Fig. 12 shows that
parameter β, which is used in greedy forwarding has an impact
on the number of hops and end-to-end delay. Considering
that GPSRQ implements recovery mode as a side algorithm
which continually seeks to forward packets to the destination
using the right-hand rule, there are no significant differences
in the PDR value for different values of β. However, β affects
the number of hops to the destination in greedy forwarding,
which results in an increased delay and overall consumption
of key material. Intuitively, different classes of traffic should
Fig. 13. Scaled average number of hops and scaled key material consumption
for various values of Taverage.
Fig. 14. The influence of the caching mechanism on PDR. Taverage = 5.
be served with varying values of β depending on the traffic
priority.
6) Impact of Caching Mechanism: One of the key parame-
ters of GPSRQ is the number of samples taken for calculating
the average duration of key material establishment process in
the long run, denoted as Taverage in Equation (8). Taverage
defines the response time to variations of the public channel
state, and it is used to determine the validity of entries in the
GPSRQ cache memory Tcache as defined by Equation (11).
Taverage affects the rate of emptying the internal node’s cache,
which has an impact in the number of hops to the destination.
To demonstrate the impact of this parameter, we simulated
30 randomly generated network topologies with 30 randomly
placed nodes, changing the values of Taverage. Fig. 13 shows
that the average number of hops as well as key consumption is
related to the Taverage. For small values, the GPSRQ caching
mechanism does not provide significant gain since the cache
memory is quickly cleared. For higher values, records in the
cache memory are kept longer, resulting in a more stable
network topology, which is reflected in the reduction of packet
forwarding (number of hops).
To demonstrate the importance of the cache mechanism,
we repeated experiments with the cache mechanism excluded.
Fig. 14 shows the comparison of the PDR values for GPSRQ
when cache mechanism is inactive and active. When the
caching mechanism is turned off, the number of returning
packets (packets with the value 2 of the loop field in the
GPSRQ header) increases considerably. The key material is
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TABLE II
QKD COMMAND HEADER - DESCRIPTION OF FIELDS
Fig. 15. Modified QKD header and QKD command header.
consumed on returning packets instead of data traffic which
should be sent on the shortest path. Due to the larger traffic
volume, the overall consumption of key material is sub-
stantially increased, which reduces the value of the PDR.
Additionally, a noticeable increase in delay was noted due to
longer routes.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This paper provides a novel QoS model and routing protocol
for QKD networks. The FQKD QoS model involves traffic
classification at the ingress node based on prioritizing traffic
into appropriate queues. It also implements additional waiting
queues at a higher network layer to adapt to the dynamic nature
of QKD networks. It defines specific metrics for public and
quantum channels, and overall QKD link metric and Mthr
values to learn about the state of links which are more than
one hop away. The GPSRQ routing protocol uses distributed
geography and reactive routing to achieve high-level scalabil-
ity. It is equipped with a caching mechanism and detection
of returning loops, enabling forwarding while minimizing
key material consumption. However, GPSRQ applications are
limited to planar topologies only since geographic routing in
networks with non-planar topologies are not able to quickly
determine the shortest path, leading to unnecessary forwarding
and increased consumption of scarce key material. Since QKD
networks are limited to metropolitan scales [2], [6], [49],
and previously deployed QKD networks were deployed on
planar topologies [2]–[6], we do not consider this restriction
as a critical deficiency. Our simulation results show that
GPSRQ outperforms most popular solutions in previously
TABLE III
MODIFIED QKD HEADER - DESCRIPTION OF FIELDS
deployed testbeds. It is reflected mainly by minimizing the
average delay and increasing PDR, which are the key parame-
ters for operative use of the real-time application [87].
The main contribution of this paper is providing novel
metrics for determining the states of quantum and public
channels as well as the overall state of QKD links, and
providing a novel QoS model and routing protocol for QKD
networks.
APPENDIX
MODIFIED QKD HEADER AND QKD COMMAND HEADER
Table II and Table III provide a short explanation of all fields
in modified QKD headers and QKD command headers [17].
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